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Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses
in Civil Litigation
Assistance of nonlegal experts is essential to effective litigation of
many disputes.' Doctors in personal injury suits, accountants in stock-
holder derivative suits, economists in antitrust suits, to name just a
few, provide specialized knowledge to the lay adjudicatory system.
Such expert assistance can be so costly,2 however, that it represents a
1. The necessity for expert testimony in civil litigation is widely recognized. See,
e.g., AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL
LITIGATION 1 (1966) (expert witnesses are among "auxiliary services . . . indispensible or
practically necessary" to maintain civil action) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC PROVISION];
D. DOUD, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1 (Wis. Law. Seminars 1959) (expert evidence "a controlling
factor in 65% of all court litigation"); IA J. KELNER, SUCCESSFUL LITIGATION TECHNIQUES
126.2 (1976) (use of expert testimony "absolutely essential in many cases"); Rosenthal,
The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 403, 405
(1935) ("IT]he fiat for expert testimony is necessity, born of the realization that the
effective administration of justice requires aid from other branches of learning and
science.")
Courts have noted the critical role of expert testimony in the cases before them. See,
e.g., Person v. Association of Bar, 414 F. Supp. 144, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[E]xpert testimony is either essential or necessary
to the best and most effective presentation of [some kinds of cases.]"; accounting and
economic testimony required for antitrust suit); National Soda Prods. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 109 Cal. App. 2d 440, 443, 240 P.2d 993, 995 (1952) ("It has long been
recognized that expert testimony is not only proper but also virtually indispensible
in cases where the relation between the facts and results may be understood only by
those with special skill or training."; civil engineers). But few causes of action require
expert testimony as a matter of law. See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31,
35 (1962); 7 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2090, 20 9 0a (3d ed. 1940).
For examples of types of questions which may require expert testimony and for an
idea of the variety of experts employed in litigation, see 1 R. MILLER, LAWYERS' SOURCE
BOOK (1971) (directory of expert services); Gair, Selecting and Preparing Expert Wit-
nesses §§ 17, 18, in 2 Am. JUR. TRIALS 585 (1964) (same).
2. The size of expert fees depends upon the requirements of the specific case or the
type of litigation. See, e.g., Burgess v. Williamson, 506 F.2d 870, 879 (5th Cir. 1975)
($20,000, accountant); Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1004
(10th Cir. 1972) ($25,000, veterinarian); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Person v.
Association of Bar, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977) ($40,000 to .560,000, antitrust economists
and accountants) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff]; J. BRENNAN, THE COST OF
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 11, 73-74 (1966) (describing two personal injury cases, one
requiring $250 for medical testimony; the other, S975 for medical examination, consulta-
tion, and testimony); D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO's IN CHARGE? 108 (1974)
(medical testimony in personal injury cases "as much as $400"). But see Franklin,
Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal
Injury Litigatihn, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21 n.99 (1961) (costs and expenses including
expert testimony exceeded S100 in only 123 of 1515 personal injury cases). The results of
the Franklin, Chanin & Mark study may not include expert fees that were paid by the
attorney and included in her own fee. See p. 1686 infra.
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litigation expense second only to the attorney's fee. Indeed, if the
attorney is paid by contingent fee,3 remuneration of experts may be
the litigant's largest out-of-pocket expense.4 The necessity of paying
an expert's fee may therefore deny many potential litigants the op-
portunity to assert their claims in court.5 Yet the ability to pay an
expert's fee is unrelated to the merits of the claim or to the im-
portance of the issues at stake.0
If compensation of an expert witness were contingent on the out-
come of the case, her fee would not constitute as substantial a barrier
to litigation. The contingent fee option, however, is generally un-
available. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)7 and the
3. A fee is contingent if its payment is conditioned on occurrence of the event that is
the object of the services performed. Attorney contingent fees are usually conditioned on
recovery of a monetary judgment or settlement by the hiring litigant. The fee is usually
a percentage of the recovery, although the parties may agree to a contingent lump sum
or an hourly rate instead. For a definitive treatment of attorney contingent fees, see F.
MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964). This Note assumes that plain-
tiffs' attorneys are compensated on a percentage contingent fee.
4. See, e.g., Burgess v. Williamson, 506 F.2d 870, 879 (5th Cir. 1975) ($43,000 attorney
fees; $20,000 accountant); J. BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 11, 73-76, 83 (two case studies
showing expert witness fees for consultation and testimony to be plaintiff's second
largest litigation expense after attorney fees). Expert fees are generally much larger than
court costs such as filing fees. Compare PUBLIC PROVISION, supra note 1, at app. C
(examples of court fees) with note 2 supra (listing expert fees).
The cost of the plaintiff's time in prosecuting her case is likely to be small compared
to attorney or expert witness fees. See J. BRENNAN, supra note 2, at 11, 73-76 (S72 plain-
tiff's time compared to S565 attorney fee and $250 expert fee in one illustrative case;
S231 plaintiff's time compared to $2110 attorney fee and $975 expert fee for examina-
tions, consultations, and testimony in another; 1966 data); cf. A. CONAPv, J. MORGAN, R.
PRATr, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 52, 193 fig.
6-10 (1964) (lawyers' fees major component of tort claim collection expenses) [hereinafter
cited as A. CONARD].
5. A distinguished commentator has complained:
In order to prove his claim, or to defend against one, a [litigant] . . . may need the
services of an engineer, or a chemist, or an expert accountant, to make an extensive-
and therefore expensive-investigation. Without the evidence which such an in-
Nestigation would reveal, a man is often bound to be defeated . . . . For want of
money, . . . many a suit has been lost, many a meritorious claim or defense has
never even been asserted.
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 94 (1950).
6. Cf. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 143-44 (1970) (lawyer
unavailability to moderate income claimants unrelated to claim merits); Spector, Financ-
ing the Courts Through Fees: Incentives and Equity in Civil Litigation, 58 JUDICATURE
330, 334 (1975) (court costs and fees create barriers unrelated to merits).
7. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility states:
A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to
a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case.
But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:
(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or tes-
tifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY, Disciplinary Rule [DR] 7-109(C) (footnote
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common law of legal ethicss prohibit such fees, as do the codes of
several expert professions.9 Although experts receive de facto con-
omitted) [hereinafter cited as CPR]. See id. Ethical Consideration [EC] 7-28 ("[I]n no
event should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to any witness.") Disciplinary
Rules are mandatory and prohibitive; their violation subjects the attorney to disciplinary
action. Ethical Considerations are merely aspirational. Preamble, id. Although the CPR
prohibition applies directly only to attorneys, it acts to prohibit explicit contingent fee
arrangements with experts altogether. Because the attorney is likely to have the most
extensive contact with the expert and to arrange compensation, see note 44 infra, her
acquiesence to the fee arrangement is a practical necessity in almost all cases.
A federal district court found this prohibition of expert contingent fees violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Person v. Association of Bar, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977); 81 DICK. L. REV. 655 (1977). The district court
found that the prohibition violated the right of access to the courts articulated by the
Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-79 (1971). 414 F. Supp. at 145.
The Second Circuit reversed, noting that the plaintiff below had not been completely
denied access to litigation even though the prohibition could discourage "litigation of
difficult and complex matters." Person v. Association of Bar, 554 F.2d at 537-38. The
Second Circuit held that the fear of perjured expert testimony provided a sufficiently
rational basis for the prohibition to withstand constitutional challenge. Id. at 538. The
court did acknowledge policy arguments in favor of removal of the prohibition, but felt
that such factors should be considered in a legislative rather than in a judicial forum.
Id. at 539. It is to such policy arguments that this Note is addressed.
8. The common law of legal ethics is the body of case law regulating the professional
activities of attorneys prior to or without reference to codification of legal ethics in the
CPR and its predecessor, the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. For judicial condemna-
tion of expert contigent fees, see, e.g., In re Imperatori, 152 App. Div. 86, 136 N.Y.S. 675
(1912); In re Schapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 10-11, 128 N.Y.S. 852, 859-60 (1911). Cf. I STATE
BAR OF OKLAHOMA, THE ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, Nos. 69, 103
(1936); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 86 (1953) (citing cases decided by state bar association
disciplinary committees prior to passage of CPR); Opinions by Committee on Legal
Ethics, 3 A.B.A. BULL., Jan. 19, 1928, opinion 45 at 24.
There have been cases, however, in which the propriety of expert contingent fees has
been upheld. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp., 13 App. Div.2d 118,
125-26, 213 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696-97 (1961), aff'd in part mem., 11 N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d
909, 225 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1962). The lower court in Person v. Association of Bar, 414 F.
Supp. 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), upheld the propriety of expert contingent fees, but was
reversed on appeal, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977). See note 11 infra (citing cases implicitly
approving contingent fees).
9. See, e.g., AMERICAN MED. As'N [AMA], OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL 56-57 (1960) (interpreting § 7 of AMA PRINCIPLES OF IEDICAL ETHICS); NATIONAL
INTERPROFESSIONAL CODE FOR PHYSICIANS AND ATTORNEYS, reprinted in 45 A.B.A.J. 33 (1959);
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF QUESTIONED DOCUMENT EXAMINERS CODE OF ETHICS f[ 7, reprinted
in 40 A.B.A.J. 690, 691 (1954). But ef. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AC-
COUNTANTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS rule 302, at 20 (1975) (contingent fees prohibited
with exception: "Fees are not regarded as being contingent if fixed by courts . . . or, in
tax matters, if determined based on the results of judicial proceedings .... ") Removing
from the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility the prohibition on expert contingent
fees set in reasonable amount by the trial court, as recommended at p. 1698 infra,
would not necessarily free all experts interested in contingent fees to enter such con-
tracts. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that other professions would follow
modification of the legal profession's prohibition, at least in the area of forensic services
for judicially supervised fees.
Prohibition of expert contingent fees in litigation is aimed primarily at preservation of
the integrity of expert testimony in court. See Preamble, NATIONAL INTERPROFESSIONAL
CODE FOR PHYSICIANS AND ATTORNEYS, 45 A.B.A.J. 33 (1959) (goals of Code include
facilitation of administration of justice); Aims and Ideals, AMERICAN SocIErTY OF QuEs-
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tingent compensation in some situations,10 explicit contracts for ex-
pert contingent fees are not enforceable in most jurisdictions.".
The proscription of contingent fees for expert witnesses is based
upon the judgment that such fees, by intensifying the expert's interest
in the outcome of the case, would undermine the reliability of the
expert's testimony. But this judgment does not withstand careful
theoretical scrutiny. This Note argues that contingent fees set in
reasonable amount by the trial court are consistent with basic goals of
TIONED DOCUMENT EXAMINERS CODE OF ETHICS, 40 A.B.A.J. 690 (1954) (purpose of Code
"the promotion of justice through the discovery and proof of the facts"); p. 1697 &
note 85 infra. But see AMA, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 56-57 (1960)
(prohibition aimed not only at preventing undue advocacy by physician, but also at
"uphold[ing] the dignity and honor of [the medical] profession"). If the legal profession
determined that contingent fees did not substantially threaten the integrity of expert
testimony or that the threat was outweighed by the benefits of such arrangements to the
adjudicatory system, other professional groups would likely defer to that assessment as
within the competence of the legal profession. To the extent that the other professions'
prohibitions stem from more persistent prejudices concerning proper professional con-
duct, modification of the legal profession's prohibition is less likely to prompt renuncia-
tion of those prohibitions.
10. Expert compensation is de facto contingent when it depends upon the success of
the litigation even though the fee contract is explicitly noncontingent. Compare note 3
supra. A de facto contingency can occur in two circumstances. First, expert compensation
is de facto contingent if the litigant's practical ability to pay depends on her success at
trial. See Person v. Association of Bar, 414 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977); Bomar, The Compensation of Expert Wit-
nesses, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 510, 521 (1935). Second, a de facto contingency arises
when an expert's continuing employment with a litigant or her attorney depends upon
success in the current case. A physician retained by an insurance company to testify in
personal injury cases is an example. See Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co., 322 Mo. 765, 775,
18 S.W.2d 42, 46 (1929); Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 2, at 21-23.
Expert contingent compensation is currently tolerated when the expert's fee is awarded
by the court to a successful plaintiff along with attorney fees. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins,
68 F.R.D. 589, 596-97 (D. Minn. 1975) (civil rights action against state facilities for
mentally retarded); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d
118, 124-25, 213 N.Y.S.2d 689, 695-96 (1961), af'd in part mein., 11 N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d
909, 225 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1962) (corporate reorganization suit; explicit recognition of de facto
contingency). Under these circumstances, the expert's explicit fee contract might be either
contingent or noncontingent. It is likely that the fee contract would be explicitly con-
tingent under statutes specifically authorizing award of expert fees. See, e.g., Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, § 12(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970) (authorizing court award of
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees); Consumer Products Safety Commission Im-
provements Act of 1976, § 10(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2073 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (same).
11. Such contracts are considered violative of public policy. See, e.g., Von Kesler v.
Baker, 131 Cal. App. 654, 658-59, 21 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1933); Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich.
293, 296-97, 130 N.V. 667, 668 (1911); 6A A. CORBIN, CONTAACTS § 1430, at 379-80 (2d ed.
1962); 14 S. WILLIsroX, CONTACrs § 1716, at 879-80 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
In upholding the enforceability of contracts for contingent expert compensation, how-
ever, a few cases have implicitly recognized the validity of such arrangements. E.g.,
Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1005-06 (10th Cir. 1972)
(contingency emphasized in dissenting opinion); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline &
Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 1953); Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo.
1032, 1041, 156 S.W.2d 597, 602 (1941).
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the civil adjudicatory system.12 The Note demonstrates that the tradi-
tional expectation that contingent fees for experts would degrade
testimonial reliability beyond present practices is exaggerated. It
establishes that the threat of effective impeachment of the contingent
fee expert would tend to limit use of this option to cases where access
to litigation would be impossible without it. Finally, using an eco-
nomic analysis the Note demonstrates that the contingent fee option
would improve access to litigation and would increase the number of
prejudgment settlements without encouraging litigants to bring frivo-
lous actions.
I. Analytical Framework
This Note will assess the expert contingent fee by comparing it with
alternative methods of compensation. The alternative methods include
plaintiff-paid expert fees, attorney-advanced expert fees, expert fees
taxed as costs, and free expert services. The comparison will be
limited to plaintiffs' experts13 and will be made in light of those goals
of the civil adjudicatory system germane to the present discussion.
These include equal access to litigation, encouragement of prejudg-
ment settlement, screening of frivolous suits, and maintenance of
testimonial reliability.14 Three of these four goals derive from the
12. As used in this Note, civil litigation denotes the entire court-oriented process for
resolution of private disputes or disputes with government in noncriminal contexts. The
process begins with the complaining party's first contact with an attorney, continues
through pretrial settlement negotiations and trial preparation, and may continue on to
judgment after trial. Excluded from consideration here are criminal and quasi-criminal
litigation, such as that centering on civil commitment. In the context of contingent
expert compensation, criminal and civil litigation are distinguishable on two grounds.
First, policy considerations in criminal litigation have led to a prohibition of all
contingent fees, including attorney contingent fees. See Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86,
90, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (1959); CPR, supra note 7, at EC 2-20, DR 2-106(C). Second, con-
tingent fees are unlikely in criminal and civil commitment cases since such cases do not
provide the litigant with a recovery to which the attorney or expert can look for her
fee. See F. MAcKNNON, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing attorney fees).
13. Although the contingent fee might be used by either party to a lawsuit, experience
with attorney compensation indicates that the contingent option is generally relevant only
to plaintiffs seeking a monetary award from which the fee can be paid. See F. MAcKINNON,
supra note 3, at 4, 25-28. In condemnation proceedings, however, the defendant seeks an
increase in her compensation from the plaintiff, and thereby creates a res from which a
successful defendant could pay a contingent fee attorney or valuation expert. See id. at
28 (attorney contingent fees by condemnation defendants). In spite of that exception,
this Note will discuss the expert contingent fee as if it were an option for plaintiffs only.
14. These goals cannot be ranked in terms of their relative importance. To establish
that an expert compensation option should be added to those options currently in use,
it is sufficient to show either that such a change would serve at least one of the goals
described above without disserving any of the others or that one or more of the goals is
clearly served by the change, while disservice to other goals is insubstantial. This Note
takes the latter approach.
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fundamental purpose of the civil adjudicatory system-the resolution
of disputes. 15 Maximization of access' 6 makes formal dispute resolu-
tion available to a larger part of the population. Encouragement of
settlement 17 and screening of frivolous suitsI8 aid in the conservation
of judicial resources. The fourth goal, maintenance of testimonial
reliability, 9 is particularly important for the present discussion, be-
cause it is the primary justification for prohibiting expert contingent
fees.20
A. Present Systems of Compensating Advocate Experts
There are two common methods of compensating experts who are
selected and employed by the parties. The first is direct payment by
the litigant.21 Unless payment is required in advance, the expert
15. See, e.g., Vecki v. Sorensen, 171 Cal. App. 2d 390, 393, 340 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1959)
(dictum) (Tobriner, J.) ("[C]ourts exist primarily to afford a forum for the settlement of
litigable matters between disputing parties."); J. FRANK, supra note 5, at 7; Morgan,
The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 705 (1977); cf.
E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 275-76 (1954), reprinted in R. SCHWARTZ & J.
SKOLNICK, SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER 17 (1970) (dispute resolution one of four es-
sential functions of law).
16. See, e.g., Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The
Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 595 (1973);
Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the
Indigents' Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV. 223 (1970); Michelman,
The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-
Part 1I, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527; Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for
Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973). Access to civil litigation means practical ability to
invoke all stages of the adjudicatory process, even though few plaintiffs will continue
beyond the settlement stage.
17. E.g., Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir. 1972); Harding v. Will, 81 Wash. 2d 132, 138, 500 P.2d 91, 96
(1972); see F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 75. Settlement is discussed further at pp.
1705-11 infra.
18. H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 4 (1970); Goodpaster, supra note 16, at 256-57;
Michelman, supra note 16, at 558-59; Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-18 (1973). Frivolous suits are dis-
cussed further at pp. 1711-13 infra.
19. See J. FRANK, supra note 5, at 14-16; J. WIGMoRE, A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1, at 5 (1935); cf. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 2-4 (1975) (search for truth "a basic value" in adversary trial).
20. See Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 296-97, 130 N.V. 667, 668 (1911); Marine
Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 118, 131-32, 213 N.Y.S.2d
689, 701-02 (1961), aff'd in part mere., 11 N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d 909, 225 N.Y.S.2d 755
(1962) (dissenting opinion); CPR, supra note 7, at EC 7-28.
21. See Gair, supra note 1, at § 25 (expert's compensation is primarily matter of
concern to client and expert); Bomar, supra note 10, at 517. Although the litigant con-
tracts directly for the expert's services, her attorney is likely to act as intermediary.
PUBLIC PROVISION, supra note 1, at 12-13; cf. F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 196-97
(general control over details of litigation by attorney); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at
32 (same).
A contract for expert litigation services and testimony for a fee is enforceable as an
employment contract. Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1002-04
(10th Cir. 1972); Hartley v. Alabama Nat'l Bank, 247 Ala. 651, 654, 25 So. 2d 680, 681-82
(1946).
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bears some risk that the litigant will default. The second common
method is the attorney-advanced expert fee.2 2 The attorney either
advances the fee or warrants that it will be paid at the end of the
litigation. In either case the attorney risks the litigant's eventual in-
ability to pay the expert's fee. Attorneys paid on a contingent basis
are more likely to advance expert fees.2
3
B. Compensation of Court-Appointed Experts
Experts can be selected and employed by the court, rather than by
the parties, to provide expert evidence presumably untainted by
partisan associations. The court-appointed expert's fee can be paid out
of public funds24 or can be taxed by the court to one of the parties.2 5
Provisions for court appointment have been tested by experimental
project,2 6 and have been enacted in court rules, 27 state statutes,2s and
22. The attorney-advanced expert fee is commonly used by indigent personal injury
plaintiffs. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY
AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY]; F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 69; cf. J. CARLIN,
LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 74, 79-80, 82 (1962) (contingent fee attorneys advance or
guarantee expenses of litigation).
23. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 67-69, 206. The attorney-advanced expert fee
does not violate legal ethics. See CPR, supra note 7, at EC 5-8, DR 7-109(C); H. DRINKER,
supra note 8, at 178.
If the attorney takes a percentage, say 30%, of the net recovery after expenses such as
expert fees, she in effect bears 30% of those expenses. If, on the other hand, the at-
torney's contingent fee is calculated on the basis of plaintiff's gross recovery, the plaintiff
bears the full weight of costs and expenses, including the expert fee. See, e.g., RULES OF
PRACrTICE, N.Y. App. Div., IST DEP'T § 603.7(e)(3); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 108.
24. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 731(b) (West 1966); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 215(d)(5); N.Y. &
BRONX COUNTIES Sup. CT. R. § 660.11(1).
25. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 706(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 731(c) (West 1966); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-17-19 (Supp. 1976). Cf. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-6-10 (1967) (requiring
equal division of appointed expert's fees between parties).
The rules employed by the court in taxing costs would determine which party pays
the fee. Normally court costs are assigned to the loser. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Guardian
Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1, 9 (1930); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.8, at
193-94 (1973); C. McCORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 60 (1935). Taxable
court costs usually include relatively insignificant charges for official courtroom services
such as clerk fees, docket fees, and jury expenses. Alternatively, expert fees could be
assessed against both parties in a proportion set by the court. See FED. R. EvID. 706(b).
Several states have adopted either the federal rule or the substantially identical uniform
rule. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 706; ME. R. EvID. 706; NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-706 (1975);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-706 (Supp. 1975); Vis. STAr. ANN. § 907.06 (1975).
26. From 1952 to 1954, court appointment of medical experts in personal injury
litigation was instituted in a foundation-funded experiment in New York City. SPECIAL
CosM. OF ASS'N OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY (1956)
[hereinafter cited as IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY]. The system used in that experi-
mental project has been enacted in N.Y. & BRONX COUNTIES SUP. CT. R. § 660.11(1).
27. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 215(d); N.Y. & BRONX COUNTIES SUP. CT. R. § 660.11(); 3
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ff 706[01], at 706-08 n.5 (1975) (citing
local federal district court rules) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGER].
28. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 730-733 (West 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-19 (Supp.
1976); S.D. COMIPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-6-1 (1967).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 9 These schemes contemplate the selec-
tion of nonpartisan experts by the court, either from an approved list
of qualified experts30 or by agreement of the parties.3 1 But court
appointment of nonpartisan experts seldom prevents parties from
employing additional experts.3 2 Moreover, court appointment has been
infrequent in those jurisdictions in which it is permitted.33
C. Other Expert Compensation Options
Fees of experts selected by the parties may be taxed as costs of the
litigation.34 The court could tax the fees against one party or it could
apportion the fees between the parties. Taxation of expert fees as costs
of litigation would put each litigant at risk of having to pay all or
part of the fees for both sides' experts.
Expert fees may also be paid by organizations such as legal aid or
group legal services. As with government funding of court-appointed
experts, payment of experts by an institutional funding source removes
the burden of expert fees from the litigant. But to the extent that the
29. FED. R. EvID. 706. Rule 706(a) allows court appointment sua sponte or on the
motion of either party. The court may select the expert to be appointed or may accept
an expert agreed upon by the parties. Id.
30. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 215(d)(1); N.Y. & BRONX COUNTIES Sup. CT. R. § 660.11(1).
31. See, e.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-6-3 (1967); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
403(b) (1942); UNIFORM EXPERT TESTIMONY ACT § 4 (1937). FED. R. EVID. 706(a) allows ex-
pert selection either by the court or by concurrence of the parties.
32. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 706(d); CAL. EVID. CODE § 733 (West 1966); S.D. COMPILED
LAws ANN. § 19-6-8 (1967); IMPARTIAL 'MEDICAL TESTIMoNY, supra note 26, at 15, 17; 3
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27, ff 706[02], at 706-15 to 706-16 (quoting J. Vigmore).
Court-appointed experts cannot provide all the expert services required by the parties.
In addition to giving testimony at trial, experts perform important settlement and trial
preparation functions. For example, expert advice may be required for the attorney's
initial evaluation of the case, for writing technical reports to be used in settlement
negotiations, and for preparing the attorney for deposition and trial cross-examination of
opposing experts. S. SPEISER & P. RHEINGOLD, NEGLIGENCE CASE TECHNIQUES § 8.2 (1969);
Bomar, supra note 10, at 510-11; Gair, supra note 1, at §§ 6, 11.
33. See p. 1696 & note 78 infra.
34. This option would tax the expenses of litigation-primarily attorney and expert
witness fees-in much the same manner as court costs are currently taxed, see note 25
supra. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3666 (West 1968) (fees of experts called to testify taxed
as costs against losing party in amounts set by court as reasonable fees); Note, Awarding
Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1222,
1222-23 (1973).
The "American rule" that each party is responsible for her own litigation expenses-
particularly attorney fees-has been debated extensively. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimburse-
inent of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The At-
torney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963); Mause, Winner
Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REV. 26 (1969); Com-
ment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
636 (1974). This mode of allocating litigation expenses is usually contrasted to the
"English rule" that the losing party bears both sides' litigation expenses. See, e.g.,
Kuenzel, supra at 80-81; Comment, supra at 637 n.2.
1687
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1680, 1977
institutional funding source has limited financial resources, it may
suffer from disabilities similar to those of an individual litigant with a
limited budget.35
D. Contingent Fees for Experts
A contingent fee for an expert witness could be calculated as a
percentage of the litigant's recovery in the case30 or as a flat hourly
fee available only if the claim is successful. It could also be awarded
by the court in a reasonable amount from the successful litigant's re-
covery.37 The contingent fee option is normally relevant only in cases
that seek a damage award from which the fee can be paid or in cases in
which the court is empowered to award fees and expenses to the
successful plaintiff.38
II. Testimonial Reliability and Expert Compensation
The purpose of the expert witness is to present specialized informa-
tion and to assist the factfinder in drawing appropriate inferences from
35. For budget constraints faced by an individual litigant, see pp. 1699-1701 infra. A
legal aid office may face analogous budget constraints, especially if the office limits the
expenditures allowed for any single case. See PUBLIC PROVISION, supra note 1, at 3;
NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, HANDBOOK OF STANDARDS 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as NLADA]; Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. UB. L.
549, 551 (1967).
In any event, few litigants have this option. Legal aid is generally not available for any
case a contingent fee attorney would take. Id. at 552. Nor is it available for clients
not meeting strict eligibility requirements. NLADA, supra at 3-4; Silverstein, supra at
555-68.
Discovery of facts and opinions held by an opponent's expert might seem to be
another option for providing expert services to a party unable to hire her own expert.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) provides for discovery of facts and opinions held by an opposing
expert expected to testify or employed for trial preparation, subject to limitation by the
court and reimbursement to the expert or employing party. Discovery, however, is likely
to occur too late to. meet the litigant's trial preparation requirements. Notes of Advisory
Comm. on 1970 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app.
at 7780 (1970); Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information,
14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 487-88 (1962). But see Long, Discovery and Experts Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111, 153-54 (1966) (proposing limitations on
discovery of experts to prevent its substitution for preparation with one's own expert).
36. Cf. F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 65-66 (percentage contingent fees for at-
torneys); CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 22, at app. IL (same). Different
types of percentage contingent fees are discussed at pp. 1707-08 & note 127 infra.
37. The court's calculations would be similar to calculations of reasonable attorney
fees in, for example, stockholder derivative and antitrust actions. See, e.g., Angoff v.
Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 188-89 (Ist Cir. 1959) (listing factors in calculation of reasonable
fees for attorneys and accountants); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp.,
13 App. Div. 2d 118, 126-27, 213 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696-97 (1961), aff'd. in part inein., 11
N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d 909, 225 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1962) (same; for appraisers serving as expert
witnesses).
38. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 18-24. Unless otherwise noted, expert con-
tingent fees are assumed to be calculated as a percentage of recovery.
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that information.3" Because of the technical nature of some evidence,
the factfinder may be wholly dependent upon expert guidance. Biased
expert testimony may leave the factfinder unable to resolve intelli-
gently the technical issues presented at trial.40 To determine the
effect of the contingent fee option on testimonial reliability, it is
necessary to examine both the sources of testimonial bias and the
safeguards against it.
A. Sources of Bias in Expert Testimony
Expert evidence is biased when it deviates substantially from the
consensus of experts in the field or, if there is no consensus, when it
fails fairly to present reasonable alternative positions. 41 Bias defined
in this manner may arise from the process of expert selection. This
will be termed "selection bias." It may also arise from the conscious or
unconscious modification of an expert's opinion to coincide more
closely with her client's needs. This will be termed "modification
bias." 4
2
39. United States v. Jackson, 425 F.2d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (jury could "receive
appreciable help" from expert pickpocket); Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402, 409 (2d
Cir. 1960) (expert's special knowledge, experience, and judgment "helpful to the court in
determining the issue"); Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85, 168
A.2d 423, 427 (1961) (expert testimony justified by "relative helplessness of the average
juror in dealing with a subject not of common knowledge"); 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,
at § 1923.
40. The general concern is that, because of its dependence on biased experts for un-
familiar information and inferences, the jury may fail to reach an accurate result; that
is, a result conforming to well-founded expert opinion. See IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTI-
MONY, supra note 26, at 3, 6-8; SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., IsT SEss., THE ROLE OF THE COURT EXPERT IN
PATENT LITIGATION 1-4 (Comm. Print 1958) (study prepared by L. Wlhinery) [hereinafter
cited as L. WHINERY]; 2 J. WIGIORE, supra note I, at § 563(2); Van Dusen, Tile Impartial
Medical Expert System: The Judicial Point of View, 34 TEM IP. L.Q. 386, 387-88 (1961).
The problems of reliability of expert evidence and of normal factual evidence differ in
two respects. The fact witness reports only perceptions within the jury's normal range of
experience. Her inferences from those perceptions are generally inadmissible. C. Mc-
CORtICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 10 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). But see FED. R. EviD. 701
(permitting lay opinion evidence that is rationally based on perception and helpful to
factfinder). The expert, on tle other hand, supplies complex technical inferences to the
jury in tie form of opinion testimony. It is generally felt that expert opinions and infer-
ences are more susceptible to effective modification or manipulation to mislead the lay
factfinder than are reports of perceptions by lay witnesses. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 27, f 706[01], at 706-07 to 706-08. Contra, 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 563(1).
41. There may be two or more acceptable schools of thought among experts in a
particular field. In such a situation, an opinion confined to one school of thought may
be said to be biased because it deviates from impartial presentation of all acceptable
viewpoints.
42. The term "bias" is usually restricted to modification of an individual expert's
opinion, termed "modification bias" in the text. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at
§ 40 (bias includes favor, hostility, self-interest, and corruption); cf. 3A J. WIGMORE, Supra
note 1, at § 940 (Chadbourn rev. 1961) (personal bias, interest, and corruption all
varieties of emotional incapacity).
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1. Selection Bias
The expert selection process can be a source of testimonial bias if
the expert is selected because of her opinion. 43 Litigants and their
attorneys are inclined to select supportive experts to increase their
chances of success at trial.44 In addition to the attorney's professional
incentives43 to select a supportive expert, strong pecuniary incentives
exist when counsel fees are contingent on the outcome of the case. The
"battle of the experts" is thus an inevitable feature of any adversary
adjudicatory system that permits parties to select their own expert
witnesses. 46
Court appointment of expert witnesses can also be a source of expert
43. Jessel, M.R., complained:
[T]he mode in which expert evidence is obtained is such as not to give the fair result
of scientific opinion to the Court. A man may go, and does sometimes, to half-a-
dozen experts .... He takes their honest opinions, he finds three in his favour and
three against him; he says to the three in his favour, Will you be kind enough to
give evidence? and he pays the three against him their fees and leaves them alone;
the other side does the same. It may not be three out of six, it may be three out of
fifty.
Thorn v. Worthing Skating Rink Co. (Ch. 1876) (opinion of Jessel, M.R.), quoted in
Plimpton v. Spiller, 6 Ch. D. 412, 415 n.2 (1877). See Notes of Advisory Comm. on Pro-
posed Rules, FED. R. EvID. 706, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 2343 (Supp. V 1975)
(describing "[t]he practice of shopping for experts" as a matter "of deep concern"); Van
Dusen, supra note 40, at 387 (noting that "opposing parties still search until they find
experts whose testimony supports their positions"); Yerion, Expert Medical Testimony in
Compensation Proceedings, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 476, 477 (1935) (competent experts
likely to hold strong convictions and opinions; party generally will call that expert
whose opinions fortify her case).
44. The expert is likely to have more contact with the attorney than with the litigant.
The attorney usually exercises effective control over the selection and the use of the
expert. See R. KEETON, TRIAL TAcTiCS AND METHODs §§ 2.15, 9.8 (2d ed. 1973) (general
discussion for attorneys on selection and use of expert witnesses); Gair, supra note 1, at
§§ 12, 19-24 (same).
The incentives that may lead the litigant and attorney to select an expert who supports
their case may also lead them to select an expert willing to adapt her opinion, or her
report of it, to suit the interests of her employers. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, MODEL
EXPERT TESTIMONY Acr (1937); F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 95 (4th ed.
1962); Van Dusen, supra note 40, at 387-88. The litigant and her attorney will not, how-
ever, prefer such a witness over an honestly supportive expert, all else being equal. The
adaptable expert is likely to be more susceptible to effective impeachment on cross-
examination, which reduces her credibility before the factfinder and her value to her
employers. R. KEETON, supra, § 9.8, at 321 (advising attorneys against use of easily im-
peachable experts); Gair, supra note 1, at § 23 (same). See pp. 1697-98 infra.
45. See CPR, supra note 7, at EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer . . . is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law .... " (footnotes omitted)); id. at EC 7-4
("The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his
client .... "); id. at EC 7-19 ("[T]he advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation
of facts and law, enables the tribunal . . . to render impartial judgments." (footnote
omitted)); id. at DR 7-10(A)(l) (prohibiting attorney from "[failing] to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law" (footnote
omitted)).
46. See L. WHINERY, supra note 40, at 2; Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Re-
visited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 427-28 (1961). Contra, Van Dusen, supra note 40, at 393.
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selection bias. If experts are selected by the judge or are called at
random from a list of experts previously approved by some neutral
authority,47 expert bias will have a random effect on the litigation
but will not be eliminated. If the question that requires expert tes-
timony is one on which competent experts in the field differ, then
random selection of a supposedly impartial expert may favor that
party whose position corresponds to the expert's predilections. 48
2. Modification Bias
In addition to bias arising from the expert selection process, bias
may result from an expert's conscious or unconscious modification of
her opinion or the report of it to favor the side for which she testifies.
This modification bias may occur because the witness identifies with
her employers or because she has a pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the case.
Experts tend generally to identify with the litigant and attorney
they are assisting, especially if their assistance involves a major invest-
ment of time or effort.490 Identification can cause the expert to make
47. If the expert is selected by the court, no selection criteria are specified. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EvID. 706(a). A few court appointment schemes provide for establishment of lists
of approved experts in certain fields. See, e.g., IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra
note 26, at 13-14 (medical experts of "extremely high standing" and lacking prominent
identification with plaintiffs or defendants selected by local medical society for New
York City's impartial medical expert project); Note, The Doctor in Court: Impartial
Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 728, 730 n.14 (1967) (same; for Los Angeles court
appointment program). Alternatively, experts can be selected for court appointment by
agreement of the parties. See p. 1687 & note 31 supra.
48. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27, ff 706[01], at 706-10 to 706-11; Levy, supra
note 46, at 419-23; Schuck, Techniques for Proof of Complicated Scientific and Economic
Facts, 40 F.R.D. 33, 38-39 (1967). Contra, Griffin, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Trial
Lawyer in Favor, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 402, 409-11 (1961). See note 41 supra.
If a court-appointed expert adequately presents the differing viewpoints on the
technical question at issue, her testimony will not be biased as defined at p. 1689
supra. Provisions for court appointment do not, however, require such evenhandedness of
appointed experts. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 706. The testimony of randomly selected experts
is biased only with respect to the specific cases in which that testimony is given. The
testimony of such experts over time should tend to be unbiased-with differing view-
points cancelling each other out in the aggregate. The eventual neutrality of aggregated
points of view is, unfortunately, quite irrelevant to the individual litigant with a specific
claim or defense which depends upon expert testimony.
49. See H. SuaoN, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 205 (3d ed. 1976). Simon defines identifica-
tion: "a person identifies himself with a group when, in making a decision, he evaluates
the several alternatives of choice in terms of their consequences for the specified group."
Id. at 205 (emphasis omitted). In this context, the "group" with which the expert may
identify is the litigant and her attorney. A major investment of time and effort by the
expert on the objectives of this group can narrow the focus of her attention and, by so
doing, prevent consideration of values and objectives inimical to the group objective.
This results in the expert's identifying with the litigating group. See id. at 210-12.
Simon's discussion of identification concerns long-term association with large organiza-
tions, but analogous influences can be expected from association of a shorter term with
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unconscious alterations in her opinion to support the other partici-
pants in pursuit of their common goal-success in the litigation. °
Perception of a direct or an indirect interest in the outcome can
lead the expert unconsciously to modify her opinion. 51 This "interest
bias" is most likely to arise when the expert has a direct financial
interest in the outcome of the case,52 such as that created by a con-
tingent fee. A similar, but less direct, interest exists if the expert be-
lieves that the result of the litigation will affect her economic interests
in other cases. Failure in the case at bar, for example, could jeopardize
a longstanding relationship with a particular litigant or attorney.,
3
Similarly, failure might diminish the expert's reputation for effective-
a small group such as the litigating team. See Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, in
SMALL GROUPS 525, 532-33 (rev. ed. A. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales eds. 1966) (studies
indicate conformity to group judgment increases significantly as group size increases
from one to three; effect of larger group size inconclusive); cf. Bales, Tile Equilibrium
Problem in Small Groups, in id at 444, 445, 467-70 (increase in small working group
agreement and solidarity over short time periods); Kelman, Compliance, Identification,
and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change, in READINGS IN ATTITUDE
CHANGE 220 (S. Himmelfarb & A. Eagly eds. 1974) (identification occurs when influence
is accepted in order to establish or maintain satisfying relationship with another person
or group).
The strength of an expert's identification with the litigant and attorney will depend
upon the amount of time and effort required of her by the working relationship. For
examples of the types of services provided by expert witnesses, see note 32 supra. Some
experts may develop long-term working relationships with particular attorneys or liti-
gants, see notes 10 supra & 67 infra, which increase the tendency to identify with their
employers' goals in the litigation. The wide variety of experts and questions requiring
expert testimony makes it difficult to generalize about experts' relationships with at-
torneys and litigants, and therefore difficult to generalize about the strength of the
identification resulting from those relationships. Cf. note 110 infra (discussing variations
in market for expert services).
50. See E. HARTLEY & R. HARTLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 392-93 (1952)
(emergence of group goals and group cohesiveness through interaction of members); H.
SIMroN, supra note 49, at 198-99 ("[T]he values [of the group] gradually become 'in-
ternalized' and are incorporated into the psychology and attitudes of the individual
participant."); L. WHINERY, supra note 40, at I (bias attributable to, inter alia, "subtle
psychological forces arising" from "prior consultations with the party").
Although identification is not explicitly mentioned in the legal literature on bias,
AVigmore's definition of bias implies that identification bias can arise from an employ-
ment relationship. See 3A J. WIGNMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 945, 949 (Chadbourn Rev.
1961) (defining testimonial bias as "all varieties of . . . prejudice" for one party or
against the other, including that arising from personal relationship). Similarly, Mc-
Cormick recognizes "favor or friendly feeling toward a party" as a form of bias distinct
from pecuniary self-interest but often evidenced by a business or employment relation-
ship. C. McCORMICK, supra note 40, at § 40 (emphasis omitted).
51. "A DOCTOR," PSYCHOLOGY IN CouRT 55-56 (anon. 1933); Bomar, supra note 10, at
522; Van Dusen, supra note 40, at 388.
52. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 40, at § 40; 3A J. WIGIMORE, supra note 1, at § 966
(Chadbourn Rev. 1961). See R. KEETON, supra note 44, at §§ 3.27, 9.8; note 68 infra
(citing cases).
53. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 2, at 20-23. For examples of experts involved in
longstanding employment relationships with particular litigants or attorneys, see note 67
infra (citing cases).
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ness as a witness, and thus decrease the future market value of her
testimony.5
4
B. Safeguards against Expert Testimonial Bias
Bias in expert evidence can be minimized in four ways: court ap-
pointment of experts, use of the qualification process, use of opposing
experts, and impeachment during cross-examination.
Court selection and employment of experts precludes expert testi-
monial bias that arises from selection for opinion and from modifica-
tion due to identification and interest. Those sources of bias stem
largely from the adversarial role of experts selected by the parties. 55
The proponents of impartial selection also argue that the presence of
a court-appointed expert moderates the biases of any additional experts
hired by the parties." The parties' experts may attempt to minimize
the appearance of partisan bias by modifying their testimony to cor-
respond more closely with the testimony of the court-appointed expert.
An expert must be qualified by the court before she is allowed to
give substantive testimony. The court must determine that the subject
matter is appropriate for expert testimony57 and that the particular
54. For a description of the market for expert testimony, see note 110 infra.
Another possibility for modification of an expert's (or any other witness's) testimony
is corruption-intentional misreporting of her opinion for a fee. Notes of Advisory Comm.
on Proposed Rules, FED. R. EvID. 706, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 2343 (Supp. V 1975);
Bomar, supra note 10, at 522; Van Dusen, supra note 40, at 387-88. That fee could be
either contingent or noncontingent. Person v. Association of Bar, 414 F. Supp. 139, 144
(ED.N.Y. 1976). Corruption may occur with either type of fee. See C. MCCoRMICK, supra
note 40, at § 40; 3A J. WIGI IoE, supra note 1, at §§ 956, 961 (Chadbourn rev. 1961).
Corrupt misreporting of an expert's opinion could also occur in response to de facto
contingency of expert compensation. For examples of de facto contingency, see note 10
supra. Intentional misreporting of an opinion in testimony by either an expert or a lay
witness is perjury. State v. Sullivan, 24 N.J. 18, 26-27, 130 A.2d 610, 615, cert. denied, 355
U.S. 840 (1957); Shook & Fletcher Supply Co. v. City of Nashville, 47 Tenn. App. 339, 350,
338 S.W.2d 237, 241 (1960). The problem of perjury is inherent in all testimony.
55. IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 7; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
40, at § 17; 2 J. NVIGNIorLE, supra note 1, at § 563; Bomar, supra note 10, at 522-23. Court
appointment may create its own random selection bias, however, as discussed at pp.
1690-91 and notes 47-48 supra.
56. IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TEsTiMONY, supra note 26, at 5, 27-28; Travis, Impartial Ex-
pert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A French Perspective, 8 INT'L LAW.
492, 519-20 (1974).
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (scientific principle or
discovery on which expert's testimony is based "must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance" in field); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32
(1938) (must show "scientific recognition" of supposed field of expertise); C. McCORMICK,
supra note 40, at § 13 ("[O]pinion evidence is not admissible if the court believes that
the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion
to be asserted even by an expert." (footnote omitted)).
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witness possesses sufficient qualifications in her field to testify.58 Al-
though qualification is generally within the discretion of the trial
judge, 9 the process of qualification seldom includes a screen for expert
bias. 60 Nevertheless, an expert whose willingness to alter her testimony
is apparent may well be disqualified by the trial judge. 61
The use of opposing partisan experts can provide an important
safeguard against the bias of any individual expert. For this safeguard
to work, however, the factfinder must be able to assess and balance
partisan presentations to eliminate the effects of bias emanating from
either side. Whether the factfinder can actually choose between com-
plex inferences in unfamiliar areas of knowledge or experience is
uncertain.62
In the adversary system, impeachment is the primary defense against
partisanship and bias in expert testimony. Counsel may impeach an
opposing expert either by cross-examination or by introducing evi-
dence that conflicts with the opposing expert's testimony.63 Both the
technical basis of the testimony64 and the expert's objectivity may be
called into question. Counsel may attempt to demonstrate selection
bias by introducing evidence of the expert's reputation for venality
among her professional peers.6 Impeachment may also be used to
demonstrate or to imply modification bias. For example, the expert
may be confronted with prior statements of her opinion-in the case at
58. See, e.g., United States v. Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1962) (degree of
expertise required for qualification dependent on difficulty of subject matter); Sinz v.
Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 753, 205 P.2d 3, 5 (1949) (medical expert in malpractice suit
must have "basic educational and professional training" and "practical knowledge" of
standard medical practices to qualify); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 40, at § 13; 2 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 560.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Baumgarten, 300 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1962); C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 40, at § 13.
60. Cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, §§ 13, 203, at 491 (list of qualification factors
omits bias); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 560 (same).
61. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (judge may exclude evidence that might tend to mis-
lead jury). Cf. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49, 55-56 (D.N.J. 1975)
(testimony of physician disallowed for tendency to "confuse or mislead" jury); Webb v.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 280, 342 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1959) ("[Ilt is of
great importance that the court carefully scrutinize [the expert's] qualifications to guard
against being led astray by the pseudo learned or charlatan .... ")
62. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27, I[ 706[01], at 706-07 to 706-08; Yerion, supra
note 43, at 476.
63. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, § 40, at 81; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 943
(Chadbourn Rev. 1961).
64. Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 115 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1940); 3A J. WIGMORE,
supra note 1, at § 992 (Chadbourn rev. 1961); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at § 16
(cross-examination on technical basis of expert opinion preferable to use of hypothetical
question).
65. Cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at § 44 (witness's reputation for veracity gen-
erally subject to impeachment); 3A J. WimtORE, supra note 1, at §§ 920, 922 (Chadbourn
rev. 1961) (same).
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bar, in prior similar cases, or in publications-that are inconsistent with
her current position.00 Identification bias may be suggested to the
factfinder by cross-examination aimed at the expert's past or present
relationship with the party, including employment either in a profes-
sional capacity or as a witness. 7 Interest bias is also a regular target of
cross-examining counsel, who frequently question the expert on the
amount, conditions, and timing of her compensation. 8 In those juris-
dictions in which judicial comment on the evidence is permitted, the
court may supplement partisan cross-examination by commenting to
the jury on the credibility of an expert witness. 69 Impeachment by
any of these techniques is intended to induce the jury to disbelieve the
expert's substantive testimony.70 It thus serves to minimize the effect
of bias in that testimony.
C. Effects of Expert Compensation Options on
Testimonial Reliability
1. Noncontingent Advocate Experts
Incentives to select experts supportive of the litigant's position exist
whether the advocate expert is chosen by the litigant or by her at-
torney. The attorney normally selects the expert for the litigant.7 1 The
attorney's incentives to exploit available selection bias derive from her
professional responsibility zealously to advocate the client's interests,72
from her own contingent fee interest in the litigation,73 and from
interest in her professional reputation.
74
66. State ex rel. State Pub. Works Bd. v. Stevenson, 5 Cal. App. 3d 60, 65, 84 Cal. Rptr.
742, 746 (1970); Brooks v. Rochester Ry., 156 N.Y. 244, 250-51, 50 N.E. 945, 946-47 (1898);
3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1041 (Chadbourn rev. 1961).
67. Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1962); Schuler v. St. Louis
Can Co., 322 Mo. 765, 773-75, 18 S.W.2d 42, 46 (1929). Cf. Mostyn v. United States, 64
F.2d 145, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (prior employment by defendant's attorney). Contra,
Zamsky v. Pittsburgh Pub. Parking Auth., 378 Pa. 38, 39-40, 105 A.2d 335, 336 (1954).
68. West Skokie Drainage Dist. v. Dawson, 243 Ill. 175, 182, 90 N.E. 377, 379-80 (1909);
Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 404-07, 43 A.2d 142, 143-44 (1945).
69. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at § 8; 9 J. WIVaMORE, supra note I, at §§ 2551,
2551a.
70. See R. KErroa, supra note 44, at § 3.4; cf. 2 J. WV1G.MORE, supra note 1, § 561, at
643 (noting the "ample and sure safeguard of cross-examination to reveal witness' real
qualifications").
71. See note 44 supra.
72. See note 45 supra.
73. See F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 200-01; Gair, supra note 1, at § 19. The in-
centives for biased expert selection in noncontingent advocate selection systems are limited
by the cost of searching for and assessing different experts. Cf. Posner, supra note 18, at
430-31 (level of expenditures on litigation limited by incremental value to case of those
expenditures).
74. See H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 99.
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Modification bias is likely in testimony from noncontingent ad-
vocate experts. Identification may arise from the expert's association
with the attorney and litigant75 Interest bias may result from de
facto contingency even when the partisan expert's compensation is
explicitly noncontingent.7 6 Thus both selection and modification biases
may arise in testimony from noncontingent advocate experts.
7
2. Court-Appointed Experts
Although court appointment of expert witnesses would reduce bias
in expert testimony, the option is infrequently invoked.78 Whatever
the reasons for this disuse, it is clear that court appointment is at
best an untested line of defense for testimonial reliability.
Court-appointed experts usually supplement rather than replace
partisan experts.7 9 Litigants and attorneys find some services unavail-
able from a court-appointed expert. Assisting the attorney in evalua-
tion of the case, aiding in settlement negotiations, and preparing for
trial 0 are services that cannot be performed for parties by the court-
appointed expert, both because she is likely to be selected relatively
late in the pretrial phase of the litigation s' and because such partisan
services are inconsistent with her neutral role. She only examines the
subject of proposed expert testimony, prepares a technical report on
that examination, and testifies at trial.8 2 The court-appointed expert
75. See pp. 1691-92 and notes 49 F, 50 supra.
76. See note 10 supra.
77. The biases of noncontingent advocate experts and the consequent tendency of
expert evidence to mislead rather than to inform juries have been subjects of extensive
critical commentary. See, e.g., Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1901); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstruc-
tions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. Cm. L. REv. 285, 292-93 (1943);
Symposium on the Impartial Medical Expert, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 357 (1961).
78. Notes of Advisory Comm. on Proposed Rules, FED. R. EVID. 706, reprinted in 28
U.S.C. app. at 2343 (Supp. V 1975); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27, 706[01], at
706-09; Note, supra note 47, at 729, 734. By 1970, the New York court appointment
program was used in only about 200 cases a year out of an incoming negligence case
load of approximately 4,500 cases in the Supreme Court and 76,000 cases in New York
City Civil Court. 16 ADM.rIN. BD. OF JuD. CONF. OF STATE OF NEW YORK, ANN. REV. 222,
A58, A79 (1971).
79. See 3 WEINSTEIN SL BERGER, supra note 27, 706[01], at 706-12; cf. IMPARTIAL
MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 15 (judge decides whether to appoint expert after
examining reports by both parties' experts).
80. See note 32 supra.
81. See IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 15 (appointment order after
pretrial conference); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27, 1[ 706[02], at 706-12 to 706-13
(appointment after pretrial conference; characterizing this, however, as "considerably
before trial" when compared to appointment at commencement of trial); Note, supra
note 47, at 729-30 (appointment at pretrial conference).
82. IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 17-19; see 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 27, f 706[02], at 706-12 to 706-13, 706-20 (preparation of report of expert's find-
ings, testimony at deposition, testimony at trial).
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may thus demonstrate less bias herself and may even moderate the
biases of the parties' experts, but her appointment will not eliminate
bias in the presentation of expert evidence to the factfinder.8 3
3. Contingent Fee Experts
Contingent fee experts are likely to exhibit the selection and mod-
ification biases of noncontingent advocate experts. In addition, the
contingent fee gives the expert a direct interest in the outcome of the
litigation. That interest may induce her to augment normal partisan
selection bias with her own screening of cases. She would select cases
in which her opinion corresponds with that most supportive of the
litigant's claim. 4 The contingent fee may also induce modification
bias; the expert's direct pecuniary interest in the outcome might lead
to modification of her opinion.sa Moreover, the expert's identification
with the party may increase under the contingent fee if the expert's
direct interest in the outcome of the litigation encourages closer as-
sociation with the attorney and litigant in assessing and preparing the
case."6 It seems probable that, absent any countervailing influences, the
contingent fee would increase selection bias and modification bias over
other advocate expert systems.
The tendency of the contingent fee to increase partisan bias can be
limited, however, by means of the adversarial impeachment process
and judicial scrutiny of contingent fees. The expert's contingent fee
arrangement with a party would be a tempting target for impeach-
ment. The suggestion of biased testimony could easily be reinforced
by opposing counsel.s 7 Effective impeachment would reduce the ex-
pert's usefulness in supporting the litigant's claim, and thus would
reduce the probability of a successful judgment. The litigant and her
83. See L. WINERY, supra note 40, at 4-5; cf. IMPARTIAL NMEDICAL TESTIMoNY, supra
note 26, at 31 (continued existence of "honest difference of opinion" between partisan
and court experts).
84. This assumes that experts are offered more cases than they wish to accept and
can therefore select among those cases for compatability. This assumption is not valid
for all experts who might be interested in contingent fee cases. The same self-selection
for opinion compatability may occur, however, as experts with lesser caseloads decide
whether to accept contingent fee cases at all. A factor in that decision is likely to be the
compatability of their opinions with the cases available.
85. Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 296-97, 130 N.V. 667, 668 (1911) ("The [con-
tingent fee expert's] interest in the amount of the damages furnished a powerful motive
for exaggeration, suppression, and misrepresentation, a temptation . . . likely to color
his testimony. ... ); cf. Provident Say. Life Assurance Soc'y v. King, 216 Ill. 416,
424, 75 N.E. 166, 170 (1905) (interest of contingent fee expert affects credibility and
weight of testimony).
86. See pp. 1691-92 and notes 49 & 50 supra.
87. N. NORDSTROsr, TIlE RIGHTS AND REWARDS OF THE 'MEDICAL VITNEss 65 (1962); Gair,
supra note 1, at § 25.
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attorney would therefore have a strong incentive to minimize the
susceptibility of their expert evidence to inferences of bias.88
Susceptibility of the contingent fee expert, or of any other partisan
expert, to impeachment on the basis of expert selection bias can be
minimized by avoiding selection of an expert with outlandish profes-
sional opinions, insubstantial credentials, or a demonstrable history of
opinion adaptability. The expert's susceptibility to impeachment on
the grounds of opinion modification bias, specifically interest bias, can
be minimized by assuring that the fee is, in both amount and condi-
tions, reasonable.8 9 If the contingent fee is not the only means of
access, the possibility of impeachment because of interest bias can be
reduced by avoiding contingent fee arrangements altogether.
Judicial scrutiny of contingent fee arrangements would further
reduce their potential for bias. Permitting only those contingent fees
set by the trial court after settlement or judgment would ensure
judicial scrutiny of the contingent fee arrangement.90 The expert's
contingent fee would be restricted by the court to a reasonable amount;
that is, a fee calculated from normal noncontingent compensation but
adjusted to account for its contingency. 91 Judicial scrutiny of con-
88. See R. KEETON, supra note 44, § 9.8, at 321-22 (advising attorneys to avoid calling
experts identified with litigation or paying large expert fees to minimize inferences of
bias by jury); Gair, supra note 1, at §§ 19, 23, 24 (advising consideration of bias, in-
tegrity, and reputation in selecting expert and avoidance of "professional experts").
89. An unreasonable contingent fee might be one which is substantially too large for
the services performed, see, e.g., Von Kesler v. Baker, 131 Cal. App. 654, 655-56, 21 P.2d
1017, 1017 (1933) (contract for 25% of judgment-SI1,756-or 20% of settlement to expert
witness, void as tending to impair administration of justice), or one conditioned on the
content of the testimony to be given, Hough v. New York, 145 App. Div. 718, 721-22, 130
N.Y.S. 407, 410 (1911) (invalidity of contract providing for fee contingent on expert's ap-
praisal being below opposing expert's).
90. See Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 118, 126-27,
213 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696-97 (1961), afj'd in part mern., 11 N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d 909, 225
N.Y.S.2d 755 (1962) (validity of experts' contingent fees upheld in part because trial court
had set fees).
91. The contingent fee contract would provide that the *expert receive a reasonable
fee, to be set by the court and to be paid by the litigant from her settlement or
judgment. See Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 188-89 (Ist Cir. 1959) (factors for calcula-
tion of reasonable attorney and accountant fees); Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 2, at 18.
The trial court might react to the appearance of excessive partisan zeal or corruption
on the expert's part by lowering her compensation award. Excessive venality or corrup-
tion could enter calculations under the rubric of "skill required" or "benefits accruing
to the public." See Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d at 188-89 (list of factors used in determin-
ing size of fee awards). Correspondingly, the professional reputation and standing of an
attorney is sometimes a factor in calculations of awarded attorney fees. Bank of China v.
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59, 68 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Armour v.
Armour, 138 N.J. Eq. 145, 162-63, 46 A.2d 826, 836 (1946).
Judicial determination of the reasonableness of the contingent fee adds an element of
uncertainty to the expert's estimate of her compensation in a contingent fee case. The
effects of this added uncertainty are discussed at note 131 infra.
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tingent fees, when added to the prospect of effective impeachment,
ensures that the contingent fee option would not reduce testimonial
reliability substantially below levels associated with current methods of
expert compensation.
III. Economic Analysis of Expert Compensation Options
The effects of expert compensation options on the goals of access to
litigation, encouragement of settlement, and screening of frivolous
suits can best be examined by means of economic analysis. The model
of the litigative process employed here assumes that litigants, attorneys,
and experts respond as rational economic units and thus maximize
their individual utilities over time.02 Perfect information is not as-
sumed9 3 and risk preferences 94 are specified when relevant.
A. Access to Civil Litigation and Expert Compensation
Access to civil litigation is limited by the prospective litigant's will-
ingness to risk a net financial loss, by the magnitude of that possible
92. The term "utility" has been used by economists to describe the subjective "hap-
piness" of an individual, see I. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMtIcs 72-78 (2d ed.
1957), or the motivating force behind consumer behavior, see P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS
OF EcoxoMic ANALYSIS 90-92 (1947). By definition, individuals prefer greater utility to
less, P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMtIcS 433-34 (10th ed. 1976), and are assumed to make those
choices that maximize the total utility they can derive from the options confronting them,
see id. at 435-36. The sources of utility need not, however, be limited to goods and services.
An individual may forgo material benefit in exchange for greater intangible satisfaction.
See, e.g., Leff, Injuiy, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE
L.J. 1, 18-21 (1970) ("spite" against one's opponent a "good"). Nonpecuniary motivations
in litigation are particularly relevant to a discussion of frivolous suits. See pp. 1711-12
& note 140 inira.
93. Perfect information means that all participants possess all of the economically
relevant data in the marketplace. If the market is for expert services, then the litigant
would know the prices and quality of all expert services, and could accurately assess her
needs for those services. With perfect information the litigant can make the optimal
choice while bearing no extra cost for gathering the information. See A. ALCHIAN &
W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE 153-54 (1969). In the real world,
few markets approach this ideal, and the costs of acquiring information on available
choices are frequently significant.
The litigant and her attorney are likely to choose among experts on the basis of
incomplete information. The number of experts assessed and the amount of information
available on each will be limited by the resources that can be devoted to the search.
Given sufficient resources, the search will continue until the cost of gathering an addi-
tional increment of information exceeds the expected gain from acquiring that increment
of information. See Posner, supra note 18, at 430-31.
94. An individual is a risk preferrer if she gains more utility from a chance for a
large sum than from a certainty of a smaller sum that is equal to the expected value of
the gamble. For example, if an individual prefers a .1 probability of gaining $100 to a
certainty of S10, then over the range $10 to $100 she is a risk preferrer. A risk avoider
would prefer the certain $10; a risk-neutral individual would be indifferent between the
two options. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 72-73 (1972).
1699
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1680, 1977
loss, and by its relation to the litigant's expected resources over time9
If a prospective plaintiff has limited financial resources and is unable
to finance litigation through borrowing, she faces a "budget con-
straint" that may deny her access to the courts.9 If the prospective
plaintiff can raise the funds to finance litigation, but is unwilling to
risk losing her investment (even though the gross expected value of
the case07 is greater than litigation expenses), she is constrained by her
inability to shift the risk of litigation."s The larger the risks or ex-
95. The potential litigant may be concerned not only by her eventual net financial
position, but also by the timing of receipts and disbursements. The major advantage to a
litigant of a contingent fee is that it matches the costs of litigation to the eventual re-
covery, both in terms of the amount of expenses and of the timing of payment.
96. A prospective plaintiff's financial resources are likely to be limited to a small
amount of liquid resources, her expected future earnings, and possessions not easily
converted into cash. Cf. A. ANDREASEN, THE DISADVANTAGED CONSUMER 33 (1975) (discre-
tionary expenditures of average family in 1960-61 totaled 52883; poor family totaled
$990); G. KATONA, L. MANDELL & J. SCHMIEDESKAMP, 1970 SURvEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES
99-100 (1971) (42% of families in 1970 had liquid assets less than 5500; median family
liquid assets $800). If these resources are insufficient to cover litigation expenses, the
prospective plaintiff faces an absolute barrier to court access. She must either forgo
litigation or attempt to raise funds by borrowing against the expected value of the lawsuit.
Another problem facing potential litigants is the timing of expenditures and the
ability to borrow money to pay litigation expenses. The litigant's assets may not easily
be converted into cash, and the litigant may lack a borrowing option. Thus, even though
the potential litigant's total resources are adequate to cover litigation expenses, she may
face a barrier to litigation. Methods of paying litigation expenses-such as the contingent
fee-that defer payment until the end of the adjudicatory process serve as short-term
loans of litigation expenses to the plaintiff.
97. The gross expected value of the case is the total of the recoveries from all possible
outcomes of the litigation after each recovery has been multiplied by its perceived
probability, but before any of the expenses of the litigation are deducted. In the
simplest case, with only two possible outcomes, a recovery of judgment J with probability
p, and no judgment with probability (1-p), the gross expected value of the case is pJ.
If a third option of settlement recovery in amount S with probability q is added, with p
becoming the probability of success at trial given no settlement, the gross expected value
of the case becomes (l-q)pJ + qS.
In the absence of perfect information, supra note 93, expected value calculations by
the participants in the litigation are based on their best estimates of probabilities and
recovery magnitudes. See Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68-69
(1969). Estimates of the same values can be expected to vary depending on who is doing
the estimating, the amount of information she possesses, and her degree of optimism or
pessimism. Cf. Posner, supra note 18, at 422-23 (litigant optimism affecting settlement
process). Only the differences in the plaintiff's and defendant's subjective estimates of
plaintiff's probability of success at trial will be noted. Estimates of all other values (J, S,
etc.) will be assumed to be the same, regardless of who estimates them. Accounting for
differing estimates of these other values would not change the analysis presented here.
98. Paying the expenses of an unsuccessful suit may cause the litigant severe personal
dislocations-such as mortgage foreclosure, substantial debt payments over a long period,
or forced sale of personal property. A risk-averse litigant, see note 94 supra, will demand
an expected return greater than her litigation expenses to compensate her for under-
taking that risk. See Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,
56 J. POLITICAL EcOx. 279, 283-87 (1948) (noting that when risk is moderate, but not
extravagant, risk premium is usually demanded). If risk-averse litigants do not have the
option of shifting the risk of litigation, their access to the courts will be limited.
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penses of litigation, the greater the number of prospective plaintiffs
who are denied access. By allowing the expert to "lend" her services to
the litigant and to assume the risk of nonpayment if the litigant loses
the suit, expert contingent fees reduce both the risk and the budget-
constraint barriers.
The noncontingent fee of the plaintiff-paid expert constitutes a
barrier whether it is paid in advance or at the end of the litigation."
Similarly, if the claimant believes she will in fact1 00 have to reimburse
the attorney's advance or guarantee of the expert fee, that amount will
also constitute a barrier because it will have to be paid notwithstand-
ing failure of the claim.
Expert fees are not an access barrier if they are paid by the govern-
ment (for court-appointed experts) or by some other nonparty such as
legal aid (for partisan experts). Under these systems the claimant need
not make any expenditure for expert fees in order to pursue her claim,
so expert compensation would not represent a risk or a threat to the
claimant's budget constraint.' 0 '
If expert fees are taxed as costs to the loser, they constitute a po-
tential barrier for any claimant with a budget constraint lower than
the anticipated taxation. Although the claimant may have a good
99. The disutility from having to pay the litigation expenses of a losing suit can be
prohibitively large. See note 98 supra. Even if the plaintiff has a high probability of
success in the litigation, making it likely that she will be able to cover a delayed expert's
fee from the settlement or judgment, a small probability of having to pay the expert in
spite of failure of the claim can still prevent access. At some very high probability of
success, of course, all but the most risk-averse plaintiffs will be willing to risk the re-
maining insignificant probability of violating their budget constraints.
An attorney or expert may charge a higher fee if payment is to be postponed because
she in effect is giving the litigant a loan in the amount of her fee. This would increase
the fee's tendency to act as a barrier to access.
100. Frequently an expert fee advanced or guaranteed by a contingent fee attorney
is in fact contingent. See note 10 supra. The attorney-advanced expert fee may be
absorbed by the unsuccessful plaintiff's attorney as part of the attorney's investment in
her own contingent fee. See F. MAcKINNONI, supra note 3, at 69-70, 206; D. ROSENTHAL,
supra note 2, at 109 (attorneys absorbing costs of litigation legally chargeable to client).
It is prohibited, however, for an attorney to undertake to pay the expenses of litigation
absent a noncontingent obligation for the litigant to repay her. See CPR, supra note 7,
at EC 5-8, DR 5-103(B); H. DRINKER, supra note 8, at 178. Alternatively, the unsuc-
cessful plaintiff's expert may lose the attorney-guaranteed expert fee if the attorney can
avoid the guarantee. Cf. Elliott & Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases,
2 L.w & CONTEMP. PROB. 466, 473 (1935) (payment of attending physician frequently
contingent on success in litigation). But if the plaintiff believes she is liable for expert
fees, they will constitute a barrier to access, even if she could in fact avoid payment. She
is likely to possess such a belief since her contract with the attorney-advanced expert will
be explicitly noncontingent. See p. 1686 and note 10 supra.
101. As a practical matter, however, court appointment does not necessarily eliminate
the need for the parties' own experts. See p. 1696 supra. Thus the fees of advocate
experts can create a barrier to access, even if the court-appointed expert is provided at
no cost to the litigants.
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chance to win, the prospect that an unsuccessful suit will require a
future expenditure beyond her budget constraint can still prevent
prosecution of the case. 10 2 If the expert fees to be taxed are the fees of
both parties' partisan experts, the risk and budget barriers imposed
are larger than when only the fee of a single court-appointed expert is
taxed.
If the expert is paid a contingent fee, no access barrier is created
since no expenditure for expert services is required of the claimant
unless and until she wins a settlement or judgment.10 3 Whether an
expert will accept a contingent fee, however, depends in part upon
her risk preferences, her capital resources, and her assessment of the
value of the case.104 If the expert's contingent fee is calculated as a
percentage of the recovery in the case,10 5 there is some gross expected
value of the case'0 6 at which her expected contingent compensation
102. Postponement of the expenditure for expert fees to the end of the litigation may,
however, improve access if the plaintiff's resources grow over time. For example, her
savings or earning capacity may increase. If security for costs were required early in
the litigation to assure payment, however, that security expenditure might exceed the
litigant's budget constraint and thereby deny access.
103. The sum of attorney and expert contingent fees, however, could theoretically be
large enough to leave the litigant with an insignificant net recovery. This would effec-
tively deny access to any litigant whose primary motivation in litigation is pecuniary
gain. If contingent fees are restricted to a reasonable amount set by the court, however,
as recommended at p. 1698 supra, the court would be unlikely to allow fees that
would entirely consume a successful litigant's recovery. Cf. F. NfAcKINNON, supra note
3, at 41-45, 183-88 (restrictions on size of attorney contingent fees).
104. In the absence of perfect information, see note 93 supra, the quality of the ex-
pert's assessment will depend on a number of factors, including her experience in
litigating similar cases, the complexity of the legal and technical issues involved, and
the extent of her preemployment consultations with the litigant and attorney. Since the
expert's initial contacts are likely to be with the attorney, see note 44 supra, the attorney
and expert may combine legal and technical expertise in assessing the viability of the
claim. See S. SPEISER K- P. RHEINGOLD, supra note 32, at § 1.2.
Whether an expert will accept a case on contingent fee may also depend on the
existence of ethical prohibitions against such fees within her own profession. See note 9
supra.
105. See, e.g., Von Kesler v. Baker, 131 Cal. App. 654, 655-56, 21 P.2d 1017, 1018
(1933) (fruit and berry broker on 25% contingent fee, 20% if settled); Sherman v. Burton,
165 Mich. 293, 294, 130 N.W. 667, 667 (1911) (physician on one-third contingent fce). At-
torney contingent fees are most commonly a customary or statutorily prescribed per-
centage of the recovery in the case. F. MNAcKiNNNON, supra note 3, at 64-66. Presumably
expert fees would use lower percentages than attorney fees. Compare expert and attorney
fees in note 4 supra. If expert contingent fees were set in a reasonable amount by the
trial court, they would probably be computed in part as a proportion of the recovery,
since the court would consider in its calculation of a reasonable fee the value of the
services to the successful litigant, i.e., the size of the recovery. See, e.g., Osguthorpe v.
Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1004 (10th Cir. 1972); Angoff v. Goldfine,
270 F.2d 185, 189 (Ist Cir. 1959). But the analysis here remains valid c.en if the expert
contingent fee is computed at a flat hourly rate, above the normal noncontingent rate.
For simplicity the expert contingent fee is assumed to be a set percentage of the recover),
unless otherwise stated.
106. See note 97 supra.
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equals what her noncontingent hourly fee would have been. 07 The
contingent fee in cases with expected values above that equivalency
point would, on average, overcompensate the expert relative to an
hourly fee; those below it would undercompensate her. An expert
would prefer contingent compensation for those cases with expected
values above the equivalency point and hourly compensation for those
below. 108
Although the expert contingent fee option would improve access to
the courts, it would not be available to all prospective plaintiffs. The
contingent fee method of paying attorneys is unavailable to many
claimants with small expected recoveries. 0 9 Similarly, many such
claimants might be unable to find experts willing to work for a
107. Although the hourly fees charged by individual experts in the same field can
be expected to vary, there will be an average or customary hourly rate for experts of
normal competence and reputation in a particular field. See, e.g., Maher, Impact of
Devastating Iniuries: Proof Relating to Economic Losses, For Both Plaintiff and De-
fendant, in PR-%crjlsxG LAW INSTITUTE, THE BIG NEGLIGENCE CASE 23, 27 (1968); Speiser,
Aviation Negligence Cases, in id. 45, 55.
108. If the customary percentage for an expert contingent fee is e (for example, 10%
of recovcry), and the gross expected value of a case is pj, see note 97 supra, then the
expert's expected contingent fee for that case is epj. The expected contingent fee will
differ by case in proportion to the differing gross expected values. If an expert's cus-
tomary hourly rate would result in a fee of E for any of a class of cases with differing
expected values, then for some case expected value epJ = E. A risk-neutral expert
would be indifferent between contingent fee and hourly compensation at that point of




A case expected value, PJ
equivalency
point
A risk-neutral expert who could choose contingent or hourly compensation for each
case by its expected value and number of hours required would charge E for cases with
pJ < A and epJ for those with pj > A, where A is the equivalency point.
109. F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 90, 196-97; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 99.
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contingent fee. 110 There is likely to be some expected value close
to the equivalency point below which the expert would demand as-
sured hourly compensation to take the case."' Further, the impeach-
ment prospect" 2 that accompanies use of contingent fee arrangements
limits the degree to which that option would enhance access for
budget-constrained claimants. Because the possibility of impeachment
would reduce the expected value of the claim at trial, an expert may
refuse to undertake some claims on contingent fee that she otherwise
would have accepted. 12
In sum, both free expert services and contingent fee experts increase
access for budget-constrained claimants," 4 although the contingent fee
would not be available to claimants with low case expected values."2t
110. The behavior of contingent fee experts seems likely to be similar to that of
contingent fee attorneys, who choose cases on the basis of the expected value of the
contingent fee, see N. SHAYNE, MAKING A PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE PROFITABLE 19-28
(1972) (suggesting methods of evaluating potential recovery). The character of the market
for expert witnesses can be expected to vary widely, however, depending on the degree
of specialization required, the size of the relevant geographical market, and the willing-
ness of experts with the requisite qualifications to testify. Descriptions of "professional
witnesses" commonly occur in reference to physicians specializing in personal injury work.
See, e.g., N. NoRDsTRorM, supra note 87, at 52-54; cf. Van Dusen, supra note 40, at 387-88
("corrupt 'medical expert' "). There are other types of experts, however, who derive the
bulk of their livelihood from litigation. See, e.g., 1 R. MILLER, supra note 1, at § 10
(various types of appraisers); id. at § 17 (automobile accident reconstruction experts); Gair,
supra note 1, at § 23 (questioned document examiners). For other types of experts, the
provision of testimony and other litigative services may be only an isolated or occasional
endeavor.
111. If the expected value of the contingent fee is below the customary hourly wage,
the expert will prefer to accept the hourly wage. See note 108 supra. A risk-averse expert
will require higher expected returns on her contingent fee cases as a premium to com-
pensate her for accepting any risks. As a result she will accept fewer low-value contingent
fee cases. The expert may, however, accept a case with an expected value somewhat be-
low the equivalency point. Analogous behavior is observed among attorneys working in
highly competitive fields, such as personal injury litigation. See J. CARLIN, supra note
22, at 88-89; cf. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 99 (less successful negligence specialists
more likely to accept imperfect liability cases). Attorneys sometimes accept less profit-
able cases hoping that they will later be offered more profitable cases by the same
client. F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 93; cf. N. SHAYNE, supra note 110, at 27-28
(criticizing as poor business practice).
112. See pp. 1697-98 supra.
113. The ability of the expert to make this assessment will depend, of course, ois the
amount of information she has. See notes 93 & 104 supra. If the contingent fee is set in
reasonable amount by the court, the added uncertainty in the size of the expert's con-
tingent fee may cause a risk-averse expert to demand an extra premium for accepting a
case on such a fee. See note 131 infra. That increases the case expected value below
which the expert would demand noncontingent compensation. This would eliminate the
contingent fee option in some cases, thus denying access to additional budget-constrained
claimants.
114. Free expert services, however, have detrimental effects on settlement incentives,
see p. 1706 infra, encourage frivolous suits, see p. 1712 infra, and are generally un-
available, see pp. 1687-88 & note 35 supra.
115. The class of individual claimants with low case expected values will include more
claimants with low incomes, at least in personal injury cases, because a major component
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Attorney-advanced and plaintiff-paid options create access barriers for
claimants with budget constraints smaller than the anticipated expert
fee. Expert fees taxed as costs create access barriers in the amount of
the anticipated taxation.
B. The Settlement Rate and Expert Compensation
Prejudgment settlement of disputes is favored as a means of de-
creasing the demand for limited judicial resources. 110 Settlement is
encouraged by higher anticipated trial litigation expenses, including
expert fees. Settlement occurs only if both parties perceive advantages
in settling their dispute instead of continuing through trial."17
At the point at which a settlement offer exceeds the plaintiff's ex-
pected value of judgment minus the additional expenses of continuing
beyond settlement through a completed trial, the plaintiff will perceive
a gain from settling. That amount is the plaintiff's minimum settle-
ment offer. Similarly, at the point at which a settlement offer is less
than the defendant's expected value of the judgment against her plus
the additional expenses of going to trial, she will perceive a gain from
settling. That amount is the defendant's maximum settlement offer.
The settlement range is the positive difference between the defendant's
maximum and the plaintiff's minimum offer."18 It thus equals the
defendant's expected value of the judgment minus the plaintiff's, 119
of personal injury damages is lost income. See A. CO,'ARD, supra note 4, at 369-80. But
low income claimants generally have more stringent budget constraints and thus a
greater need for the contingent fee for access. See note 96 supra. Such screening of cases
with low expected value by the contingent fee expert would have a regressive effect
across income, denying access via the contingent fee more frequently to low income
claimants. This regressive effect is bound to be less severe than the regressive effect of
noncontingent fees, however, since low income claimants are more likely to be denied
access if the contingent fee is not even available to them as an option. Moreover, the
regressive differential in access via the contingent fee may be mitigated somewhat if
funding for expert services for low income legal aid clients is available. See NLADA,
supra note 35, at 8 (recommending availability of such funding). But see pp. 1687-88 &
note 35 supra.
116. See p. 1685 & note 17 supra.
117. The following discussion of the determinants of settlement relies heavily on H.
Ross, supra note 18; Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61,
101-05 (1971); Posner, supra note 18, at 417-29; and Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22
STAN. L. REv. 67 (1969).
118. A settlement range exists only if the defendant's maximum settlement offer ex-
ceeds the plaintiff's minimum settlement offer. If the plaintiff's minimum is larger than
the defendant's maximum, there is no settlement amount that both parties prefer over
continuing to trial and therefore no settlement range. If the plaintiff's minimum and
defendant's maximum settlement offers are equal, the parties will be indifferent between
settling at that amount and continuing to trial.
119. The parties' expected values of the judgment may diverge because of differences
in information or perceived differences in the skills of their attorneys and experts, or
simply because of differences in their degree of optimism. See Posner, supra note 18, at
418-20, 422-23; Note, supra note 117, at 75-76; note 97 supra.
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plus the total of both parties' extra litigation expenses for continuing
past settlement negotiations through a completed trial. 120
The actual settlement amount agreed to within the settlement range
depends upon the negotiating skills of the parties.12 ' The wider the
settlement range, the more each party can gain over trial expectations
by settling.12 2 Any factor that widens the settlement range also in-
creases incentives for settlement. If no positive settlement range exists,
the case can be expected to continue on to judgment.123
Expert compensation affects settlement by increasing the expenses
of taking the case to trial. The larger the expected cost of expert
services necessary for the trial, the lower will be the plaintiff's mini-
mum settlement offer and the higher the defendant's maximum offer.
This widening of the settlement range encourages settlement. If ex-
perts are provided at no cost to the parties (as is the case with state-
paid, court-appointed experts or experts paid by legal aid), the parties'
trial litigation expenses will decrease. The incentives to settle and, all
else being equal, the settlement rate will also decrease. If the trial fees
of either a court-appointed expert or the parties' own advocate experts
are taxed as costs, the settlement range will reflect those fees dis-
counted by a factor for the divergence of the parties' estimates of who
will have to pay those fees.'
24
120. H. Ross, supra note 18, at 144-46; Posner, supra note 18, at 417-19; Note, supra
note 117, at 70-80.
A positive settlement range is likely to exist even if the two parties' estimates of the
expected value of judgment at trial are equal. Plaintiff's minimum settlement offer is
determined by subtracting her trial litigation expenses from her expected judgment gain.
In contrast, defendant's maximum offer is determined by adding her trial litigation
expenses to her expected judgment loss to plaintiff. Thus, if both parties estimate the
same expected value of judgment, any trial litigation expenses, for either party or both,
will create a positive settlement range. See H. Ross, supra note 18, at 145; Posner, supra
note 18, at 419; Note, supra note 117, at 72-73.
If either party is risk-preferring or risk-averse, see note 94 supra, her settlement offer
will shift to account for the risk of continuing to trial. For example, if the plaintiff is
risk-preferring, her minimum settlement offer will increase to account for her higher
valuation of the gamble of going to trial.
121. H. Ross, supra note 18, at 142-44; Note, supra note 117, at 71.
122. The wider the settlement range, the greater the gain from avoiding trial that
the parties may split between them. See H. Ross, supra note 18, at 144-46 & fig. 4.1. But
cf. id. at 159, 164 (negotiations may fail if settlement range is too wide; each party un-
willing to allow the other very substantial benefits from settlement). Settlement negotia-
tions might also break down if either party is a risk preferrer: the plaintiff preferring to
gamble on the possibility of a large judgment, or the defendant preferring to gamble on
no judgment.
123. Settlement might occur, however, if the parties' limiting settlement offers are
equal. See note 118 supra.
124. If the two parties are relatively pessimistic about their chances at trial, the de-
fendant estimating a significantly higher probability of success for the plaintiff than tie
plaintiff does, they will magnify the expected cost of the taxation by each overestimating
the likelihood that she will have to pay it. Such pessimism increases the settlement range
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Both plaintiff-paid and attorney-advanced compensation options add
the full amount of expected trial expert fees to the settlement range.
This increases settlement incentives over both the legal aid option and
the court-appointed option, either state-paid or taxed. Whether taxed
fees of partisan experts exceed plaintiff-paid and attorney-advanced
compensation depends upon the parties' estimates of their chances of
prevailing at trial.1
25
The effect of the expert contingent fee on the settlement rate de-
pends upon how the contingent fee is calculated. It could be cal-
culated as a percentage of recovery which increases with progressive
stages of the litigation to account for increased risk and workload in
cases taken to trial.12 6 It could also be fixed at a set percentage whether
the case is tried or settled. 2 7 An increasing-percentage contingent fee
would be fixed at one percentage of the plaintiff's recovery at settle-
ment and at a higher percentage after judgment. Similarly, a court
by lowering plaintiff's minimum and raising defendant's maximum settlement offers,
and thus increases the likelihood of settlement. If, on the other hand, each party is
optimistic about her chances of prevailing at trial, each will lower her expectation that
she will have to pay the taxation; this would decrease the settlement range and would
discourage settlement.
125. See note 124 supra. If the parties have identical estimates of the plaintiff's
probability of success at trial, the settlement range for taxed partisan experts is the
same as for party-paid or attorney-advanced experts. There are, however, interactions
between the parties' estimates of their probability of success at trial and their expendi-
tures on the litigation. These interactions are extremely complex and do not lend them-
selves to determinate solutions. This Note will thus follow Professor Posner's assumption
that they do not affect the results of the settlement analysis. See Posner, supra note 18,
at 419-20, 437-38.
126. The probability of recovery on the plaintiff's claim decreases, increasing the
risk of nonrecovery, as the case progresses through successive litigation stages. See
Franklin, Chanin g- Mark, supra note 2, at 14 (personal injury plaintiffs gain settlement
in 85% of cases closed before trial, 80% of cases closed during trial, but win only
60% of verdicts). That the expert's workload increases disproportionately as the case
progresses past settlement to trial can be inferred from the fact that litigation expenses
increase disproportionately to the increase in recovery as the case progresses to trial.
See A. CONARD, supra note 4, at 193, fig. 6-11. For examples of increasing-percentage
contingent fees for attorneys, see CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 22,
at app. II.
127. For examples of constant percentage contingent fees for attorneys, see CONTINGENT
FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 22, at app. II.
Another type of variable percentage contingent fee reduces the percentage of the
recovery as the recovery increases in size. E.g., RULES OF PRAcTICE, N.Y. App. Div. IST
DEP'T § 603.7. For any given size of recovery, this option is similar to a fixed percentage
contingent fee in that it does not depend on the stage of litigation at which recovery is
gained.
A contingent fee calculated at an hourly rate will approximate either a percentage fee
increasing with successive litigation stages, a constant percentage fee, or a percentage fee
decreasing as recovery increases. This depends upon whether the hours required of the
expert increase faster, at the same rate, or slower than the rate at which the size of
recovery increases as a particular case moves beyond settlement and through trial. There
is insufficient empirical evidence available to determine which of these is the most likely
relationship.
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setting contingent fees in "reasonable amount" might well find that
increasing levels of effort justify proportionately more generous
awards. 12 8 The size of the trial increment in the expert's contingent
fee affects the size of the settlement range by lowering or raising the
plaintiff's minimum settlement offer: the larger the increment to
plaintiff's trial expenses, the lower will be her minimum settlement
offer. The lower the plaintiff's offer, assuming no change in the de-
fendant's maximum settlement offer, the wider the settlement range
will be. The resulting increase in the size of the settlement range in-
creases the likelihood that settlement will occur. 129
It is not certain whether the expected value of the contingent fee
trial increment is larger than the trial increment of an attorney-
advanced or plaintiff-paid hourly fee. On average, however, the con-
tribution of increasing-percentage expert contingent fees to trial
litigation expenses, and hence to settlement incentives, may well exceed
the contribution of noncontingent hourly fees.' 30 This is because
128. Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (Ist Cir. 1959), lists the factors to be con-
sidered by the court in setting reasonable fees for attorneys and accountants in a stock-
holder derivative suit:
These factors are: the amount recovered ... ; the time fairly required to be spent on
the case; the skill required and employed . . . ; the difficulty encountered . . . ; the
prevailing rate of compensation . . . ; the contingent nature of the fees, with the
accompanying risk of wasting hours of work, overhead and expenses . . . ; and the
benefits accruing to the public ....
Trial courts generally are afforded wide discretion in fixing reasonable fees. Dumas v.
King, 157 F.2d 463, 466 (8th Cir. 1946) (attorney fees). Louisiana permits the taxing of
reasonable expert fees, set by the court, against the loser. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3666
(Vest 1968). Under the enabling statute, however, courts are limited to fixing a reason-
able fee on the basis of the value of the time employed and the degree of skill or learn-
ing required. Id. § 13:3666(A); State v. Salemi, 249 La. 1078, 1083, 193 So. 2d 252, 254
(1966).
129. It could be argued that a plaintiff with both attorney and expert on contingent
fee might nevertheless feel that she has nothing to lose in pressing the claim to trial
rather than accepting settlement. This ignores the obvious fact that the plaintiff can
lose the settlement itself by proceeding to trial, where she may lose. Furthermore, be-
cause of their contingent fee interests, the attorney and expert might pressure the plain-
tiff to accept the settlement. See pp. 1709-10 infra.
130. The trial increment for an increasing-percentage fee will probably be no smaller
a proportion of the total contingent fee than the trial increment of a noncontingent fee
is of the total noncontingent fee. The increase in the percentage of judgment recovery
over the percentage of settlement recovery in an increasing percentage contingent fee
must compensate the expert for two additional costs at trial. The first is the increase in
hours required. Comparison with attorneys' fees indicates that such an increase in hours
required may exceed the increase in recovery at trial. The second is the increase in risk
associated with trial. See note 126 supra.
If expert fees are set by the court, rather than by an increasing-percentage contingent
fee scale, one of the factors used to determine a reasonable fee is the number of hours of
work required of the expert. See, e.g., Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (Ist Cir.
1959); State v. Salemi, 249 La. 1078, 1083, 193 So. 2d 252, 254 (1966). Since risk is also a
factor in court fee calculations, see Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d at 189, the trial
proportion of a court-calculated fee should be no smaller than that proportion of a
noncontingent hourly fee. See p. 1707 supra. Similarly, if the expert's contingent fee
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contingent fees, discounted for the contingency factor, are not smaller
on average than normal hourly fees for the same services; they may
indeed be larger. This conclusion is supported by analogy to attorney
contingent fees.13
1
If the expert's contingent fee is calculated as a set percentage of the
recovery regardless of the stage in the litigation at which recovery is
won, the only increment to expert fees from continuing to trial is at-
tributable to the larger expected value of the trial judgment over a
settlement recovery. The amount the plaintiff's expert fees will con-
tribute to the settlement range is the contingent fee percentage times
the difference between expected value at trial and at settlement.
132
If the expert's best estimates of her expected fee at trial and of the
value of her time and services indicate a strong personal advantage in
settlement, she may attempt to influence the settlement decision
through her contacts with the plaintiff's attorney during preparation
of the case.' 33 The expert's ability to make this assessment is limited by
were set on an hourly rate, rather than as a percentage of recovery, the proportion of
the total fee through a completed trial accounted for by the fee through settlement
would be the same as for a noncontingent hourly fee.
131. See Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (Ist Cir. 1959); Marine Midland Trust
Co. v. Forty Wall St. Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 118, 122-23, 213 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693 (1961), alf'd
in part inein., I1 N.Y.2d 679, 180 N.E.2d 909, 125 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1962); F. MAcKINNO.N,
supra note 3. at 159. If experts are risk-averse, they will demand larger compensation for
contingent than for hourly fees to account for the extra risk involved. It has been
observed that clients usually prefer to shift the risks of litigation to attorneys by use of
contingent fees. Id. at 205.06; see Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 2, at 22 & n.103
(contingent fee "almost universal" in personal injury cases).
If expert fees are set by the court in reasonable amount, the court's estimate of
reasonableness adds another element of uncertainty to the expert's contingent fee. A
risk-averse expert would require a premium for risking undercompensation by a par-
simonious judge. That premium would increase the difference between normal hourly
compensation and the expected value of contingent compensation set by the court.
132. The size of the contribution of the plaintiff's expert fees to the settlement range
depends upon the magnitude of the expert contingent fee percentage and the difference
between the expected judgment and the settlement.
133. The attorney is likely to have effective power to make the settlement decision
for the plaintiff. F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 196-97; H. Ross, supra note 18, at 82-83.
See note 44 supra.
The witness's attempts to influence settlement may range from discussion of the ad-
vantages of settling and of the uncertainties of trial to conscious or unconscious minimi-
zation of the likelihood of success on the technical issues in her presettlement report.
She may even threaten to discontinue her participation beyond settlement. Analogous
behavior has been observed among contingent fee attorneys with constant percentage
contingent fees. F. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 197-98 ("[Tjhe lawvyer's substantial in-
terest in the recovery leads him to settle cases at a time and in an amount which suits
his interests but not necessarily those, of his client."); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at
96-99 ("[A] quick settlement is often in the lawyer's financial interest .... "); H. Ross,
supra note 18, at 82-83 (same); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Con-
tingent Fee in Personal Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1133-36 (1970) (same;
demonstrated by economic model). The attorney's behavior is not entirely analogous,
however, because she is likely to exercise greater influence over the plaintiff's settlement
decision.
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her imperfect information. Moreover, the effectiveness of the expert's
attempts to influence the settlement decision depends upon the extent
of her contacts with the plaintiff and attorney and upon the degree to
which her participation is essential to effective prosecution of the case.
If the parties' expectations of effective impeachment of the con-
tingent fee witness reduce their estimates of the expected value of the
claim at trial, the size but probably not the frequency of settlements
will decrease. If both parties are aware of the plaintiff's fee arrange-
ment 134 and of its susceptibility to impeachment, and therefore lower
their assessments of the claim's probability of success at trial accord-
ingly, both the plaintiff's minimum settlement offer and the de-
fendant's maximum offer will decrease. This shifts the settlement
range toward smaller settlements and thus decreases the average size of
settlements achieved. 135 If at the time of settlement negotiations the
defendant is not aware of the plaintiff's expert contingent fee, only
the plaintiff's minimum settlement offer will decrease, which will
widen the settlement range and encourage settlement. 30 The decrease
in the plaintiff's minimum offer will also lower the average settlement
amount.
Expert compensation options thus have differing effects on settle-
ment incentives. Free expert services do not contribute to trial litiga-
tion expenses. They minimize the settlement range in any individual
case and minimize settlement incentives in general. Expert fees taxed
as costs contribute more to expected trial litigation expenses, and
therefore to settlement incentives, but less than the full amount of the
taxation if each party is optimistic about prevailing at trial. If the
parties are both pessimistic about prevailing at trial, expected trial
litigation expenses increase by more than the amount of the taxation;
134. The compensation of expert witnesses is subject to pretrial discovery-under, for
example, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)-for the purpose of showing her bias on cross-examination.
Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 976, 978 (W.D. Mich.
1970) (defendant required to answer interrogatories on compensation and other relation-
ships of its experts with itself, other tobacco companies, and the Tobacco Institute); Da
Silva v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 364, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (dictum) (inter-
rogatories on compensation of an expert in prior cases to show bias generally allowed,
but discovery denied); ci. United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411, 415-16
(N.D. Cal. 1965) (deposition of plaintiff's experts for preparation for cross-examination
allowed).
135. Whether the settlement range will be wider will depend on tile relative sizes of
plaintiff's and defendant's assessments of the effect of tle contingent fee ol the plaintiff's
probability of success at trial. If, for example, the plaintiff believes the effect will be
large while the defendant believes it will be small, the plaintiff's minimum settlement
offer will drop more than the defendant's maximum, and thus will widen the settlement
range.
136. The plaintiff's minimum settlement offer will decrease only to the extent that
she fears discovery of her expert's contingent fee by the defendant.
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the settlement range and therefore the incentives to settle also increase.
Attorney-advanced and plaintiff-paid expert fees contribute in full
amount to trial litigation expenses and increase settlement incentives
over free expert services.
Contingent expert fees seem likely to increase settlement incentives.
An increasing-percentage contingent fee would probably increase trial
litigation expenses and thereby increase settlement incentives over
any noncontingent option. A constant-percentage contingent fee may
cause the expert to pressure the plaintiff to settle. The prospect of
impeachment of the contingent fee expert for her interest in the
litigation would tend to decrease the size of settlements and perhaps
to increase their frequency, regardless of how the contingent fee is
calculated.
C. Frivolous Suits and Expert Compensation
Frivolous suits are defined as claims of such insubstantial merit as
to have negligible probability of success at trial, as assessed by the trial
court. 1 37 They are disfavored as an unnecessary burden on limited
judicial resources.138 Various procedural devices, such as motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment, are designed to screen
out such suits. 139
137. See Fletcher v. Young, 222 F.2d 222, 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 916
(1955) (suit attempting to reopen conclusively adjudicated issues held frivolous and
dismissed); B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MIEANS 145 (1970) (social
value of litigation related to legitimacy of claims asserted; "stirring up of frivolous or
fraudulent claims is undoubtedly evil"); cf. Strong v. Sproul, 53 N.Y. 497, 499 (1873) ("A
frivolous answer is one so clearly and palpably bad as to require no argument .... ")
Nuisance or strike suits are a variety of frivolous suits that use the threat of sub-
stantial litigation expenses to gain a settlement unjustified by the merits. Adams v.
Crown Coal & Tow Co., 198 I1. 445, 450, 65 N.E. 97, 99 (1902) (dictum) (settlement not
valid "if the claim to the right was put forth as a mere pretense, to extort money or to
induce the execution of the agreement"); Roach v. Franchises Int'l, Inc., 32 App. Div.
2d 247, 250, 300 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (1969) (defining stockholder "strike suit" as action
brought in hope of gaining attorney fees or large settlement, but with no intention of
benefiting corporation); Shapiro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 284, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (1965)
(same); see H. Ross, supra note 18, at 199-211 (describing insurance company practices
of settling suits without liability, in response to "danger value" or "nuisance value" of
the claim). Nuisance suits differ from other frivolous suits only in the plaintiff's aware-
ness of the frivolity of the claim and intention not to go to trial if settlement fails.
138. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 38 F.R.D. 170, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afJ'd sub
norn. Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1966), ajf'd sub nora. First
Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968) ("policy against the undue harassment
of a litigant through a spurious lawsuit"); Berkal v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co., 327 Mass.
329, 333, 98 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1951) (unreasonable and unnecessary litigation not to be en-
couraged); Spector, supra note 6, at 332 (unnecessary cases increase court congestion).
139. Fletcher v. Young, 222 F.2d 222, 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 916 (1955)
(dismissal); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 38 F.R.D. 170, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd
sub norn. Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1966), afj'd sub nor.
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968) (summary judgment); Gift Stars,
Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (punitive taxation of court costs).
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A plaintiff is more likely to press her frivolous claim the greater
the total expected value she perceives for it.14 ° Faced with a choice of
expert compensation options, the frivolous plaintiff will choose the
option that gives her claim the greatest net expected value.
By imposing expert costs on the plaintiff, the plaintiff-paid and
attorney-advanced compensation options tend to discourage frivolous
suits. Expansion of free expert services, on the other hand, would tend
to encourage frivolous suits by minimizing the expenses of litigation
and by increasing the perceived net expected values of frivolous
claims.141 Taxation of partisan expert fees against the loser would
discourage frivolous suits relative to present practices by substantially
increasing expected litigation expenses to a plaintiff with an insub-
stantial probability of success. 14 2 The expert contingent fee probably
would not increase the incidence of frivolous suits. In cases with low
expected values, the expert would insist on a noncontingent hourly
fee and thus would make the availability of the contingent fee ir-
relevant. 4 3 The expert therefore would refuse to take many frivolous
suits.
44
By eliminating the commitment to pay expert expenses when the
suit is unsuccessful, the contingent fee may encourage frivolous suits
with expected values large enough to attract experts willing to accept
contingent compensation.145 The contingent fee, by promoting settle-
140. This assumes economically rational behavior. See p. 1699 supra. The assumption
of economic rationality, however, does not exclude other motivations for litigation. See
note 92 supra. Frivolous suits might be motivated by a variety of nonpecuniary 'factors,
including spite, a feeling of being wronged, or even political or social expression. See
Leff, supra note 92, at 18-21 (spite and feeling of being wronged). But cf. R. HUNTING 9-
G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? 86-89 (1962) (attitudes of personal injury
claimants toward insurance companies, lawyers, and compensation system have no effect on
decision to sue). Whatever the plaintiff's primary motivation in initiating a frivolous
suit, however, she will be further encouraged by any factor which increases its potential
economic value, all else being equal.
141. Budgetary constraints on a legal aid office, however, may cause it to screen
frivolous suits. See NLADA, supra note 35, at 5-6.
142. Taxation of litigation expenses against the loser is frequently mentioned as a
means of deterring frivolous suits. E.g., F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 142-43; Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636,
651 (1974); cf. Posner, supra note 18, at 438-39 (taxation of costs may screen out some
small but meritorious claims).
143. See pp. 1703-04 supra.
144. Cf. F. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 201, 206 (contingent fee attorneys screen out
cases in which chances of recovery are slight); D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 2, at 99 (same);
N. SHAYNE, MAKING A PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE PROFITABLE 27-28 (1972) (advising con-
tingent fee attorneys to reject poor liability cases).
145. Frivolous suits are defined only on the basis of their probability of success at
trial. See p. 1711 supra. In order to attract a contingent fee expert, therefore, a
frivolous suit must have large damages if liability is found, which would inflate the ex-
pected value at trial.
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ment, would also encourage frivolous suits brought with the aim of
gaining a settlement unjustified on the merits. 146 The prospect of
effective impeachment of the contingent fee expert, however, would
reduce the expected value of the plaintiff's claim. This would en-
courage the expert to screen more cases and would discourage plain-
tiffs from pursuing their frivolous claims.'
47
The contingent fee could also increase the expected value of the case by increasing the
likelihood of settlement. If the contingent fee increases the probability of settlement more
than it decreases the size of settlements, see pp. 1709-10 supra, it will increase the ex-
pected value of settlement and, as a consequence, increase the expected value of the case,
see note 97 supra. This will shift some cases above the expert's resistance point, thus limit-
ing the contingent fee expert's effectiveness as a screen against frivolous suits.
146. The expected value of the frivolous claim could increase sufficiently to avoid
screening, see note 145 supra, if conditions are conducive to gaining a nuisance settle-
ment. See note 137 supra. Encouragement of such nuisance suits results from encourage-
ment of settlement, since wider settlement ranges allow greater potential for gain through
skillful negotiation by the nuisance plaintiff. A frivolous suit will be most useful in
extorting a settlement when the defendant's litigation expenses are high, the plaintiff's
litigation expenses are low, and the defendant has a higher assessment of the expected
value of the claim at trial than does the plaintiff. See generally H. Ross, supra note 18,
at 199-211. High defendant litigation expenses and relative pessimism of the parties both
widen the settlement range, see pp. 1705-06 & note 124 supra, and make settlement more
attractive to the defendant confronted with a nuisance claim. Low litigation expenses for
the plaintiff aid the nuisance claim by minimizing the plaintiff's risk and by increasing
the credibility of her threat to press the defendant to trial.
The contingent fee may well encourage nuisance suits, since the plaintiff need not
pay expert fees except out of the nuisance settlement. But the plaintiff may prefer non-
contingent hourly compensation over a contingent fee for support of a nuisance claim if
use of hourly compensation increases the expected value of the claim. This would occur
if the perceived likelihood of settlement is high and the contingent fee is substantially
more expensive than assured compensation. See pp. 1707-09 supra.
Nuisance suits may also be encouraged by the prospect of effective impeachment of
contingent fee experts. If the defendant is not aware of the contingent fee arrangement,
the widening of the settlement range from the decrease in the plaintiff's minimum
settlement offer will encourage nuisance suits. If the defendant is aware of the con-
tingency, her estimation of the trial expected value of the claim will decrease. If her
expected litigation expenses remain the same, that decrease may increase her preference
for settlement by lessening the size of the prospective settlement compared to her litiga-
tion expenses. See H. Ross, supra note 18, at 204-11 (defending insurance adjusters
willing to settle low expected value claims to avoid disproportionate processing costs).
Reduction in the defendant's assessment of the expected value of the case at trial might
reduce the settlement range, however, if the defendant believes that a contingent fee
expert would be susceptible to effective impeachment at trial. See note 135 supra. Further-
more, repeating defendants may not be willing to settle strike suits if they believe their
intransigence in a few cases will be rewarded by a decrease in such claims. Compare
Posner, supra note 18, at 433-36 (dismissing settlement of nuisance suit as irrational for
repeat defendant) with H. Ross, supra note 18, at 204-11 (in spite of rhetoric to con-
trary, insurance companies regularly pay nuisance settlements).
In summary, it is possible that nuisance suits will be encouraged by expert contingent
fees. But the risk of nuisance suits is implicit in any policy that facilitates settlement.
The procedural devices used to screen other frivolous suits would have to be relied upon
to limit this unfavorable effect of allowing expert contingent fees. See p. 1711 & note
139 supra.
147. See p. 1704 supra.
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Conclusion
Contingent fees for expert witnesses should be permitted when set
in reasonable amount by the trial court. The court's participation,
coupled with the prospect of effective impeachment, would minimize
the danger of bias in expert testimony. The contingent fee would
improve access to civil litigation for budget-constrained and risk-averse
claimants. Removal of the prohibition on expert contingent fees would,
of course, also make available that payment option to litigants for
whom access is not a problem. This is not, however, a substantial con-
cern, for the threat of effective impeachment would encourage litigants
who can afford noncontingent compensation to avoid contingency.
Nevertheless, some litigants with a choice may select contingent com-
pensation in spite of its harm to the expected value of their claims.
But, by encouraging settlement of those claims, the contingent fee
option would relieve some of the burden on the adjudicatory system
added by improved access.
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